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ABSTRACT
While Africa has often been portrayed as peripheral to major global 
economic flows, the copper mines in the South of the DRC as the 
port of Dar es Salaam are hubs of extraction and trade at the heart 
of the global economy. This article departs from the notion of the 
gatekeeper state, which describes the creation of islands of effective 
state territoriality around such gates in the colonial encounter, 
producing postcolonial states that essentially only control enclaves 
and corridors in their territory. These form the basis for an outward, 
extraction-oriented political economy. The article proposes a 
reconceptualisation of gatekeeping as a set of practices performed 
by a range of actors, including (but not limited to) governments. I 
argue that this brings into view how the political geography of gates is 
being transformed by a multitude of actors including from the Global 
South. It is also shaped by powerful transnational technical systems 
and logistics. Empirically, this will be explored through a study of Dar 
and Bagamoyo ports in Tanzania. Studying gatekeeping and gate-
making practices around these ports diversifies our understanding 
of political transformations around gates and helps to go beyond the 
theories based on the more frequently studied extractive industries.
Introduction
While Africa has often been portrayed as peripheral to major global economic flows, many 
parts of it are neatly integrated into networks of global production and trade. The copper 
and gold mines in the DRC as the port of Dar es Salaam are at the heart of the global econ-
omy. Debates about the political economy of the African state have long stressed how much 
the rents derived from controlling such sites – those that connect ‘l’Afrique utile’ with the 
outside world – have been a major source of revenue for the colonial and postcolonial state.1 
Territorial control has never been very effectively implemented by most African states,2 
partly because other strategies of rule have worked better. Territoriality has remained, how-
ever, an important governmental technology by which multinational mining companies 
govern concessions and generate revenues that governments can control thanks to the 
norm of sovereignty.3 Cooper’s notion of the gatekeeper state, the focus of this special issue, 
can be situated in this tradition of thought. It establishes the creation of islands of 
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territoriality, and an outward, extraction-oriented political economy in the colonial encoun-
ter. This geography of islands, according to the argument, has been reproduced by postco-
lonial governments together with a plethora of international and transnational actors.4 
Subsequent literature has stressed elite adaptation and the (re)centralisation of rents by 
governments,5 faction fighting, and state capture in the patronage-based politics of capitalist 
accumulation,6 and the reconfiguration (not decline) of the state through privatisation and 
the indirect discharge of state functions to private actors.7
It is important to note though that Cooper himself has always been committed to close 
historical work and attention to specificities and particularities.8 He therefore has argued for 
the necessity of looking beyond false dichotomies, such as those of Africa and the global 
economy, or market and state. There is, thus, little to support a sweeping categorisation of 
African states as gatekeeper states, different from states elsewhere.9 While it is a useful met-
aphor, I argue that privileging the state in analyses of gatekeeping limits its contemporary 
analytical purchase in regard to the growing number of large-scale infrastructure projects 
funded by traditional, as well as new actors. This is all the more crucial in times in which 
‘gateway’ metaphors are ubiquitously used by donors for large-scale infrastructure projects 
promoted in their name.10 Putting questions about the host state first prevents us from 
asking other – equally relevant – questions about new infrastructure hubs, such as: What do 
these gates do? What geographies of power and authority emerge around them, especially 
when they are not gates that are easy to control, like point source extraction (oil, industrial 
mining), but part of the global transport infrastructure; such as ports.
To answer these questions, this article suggests understanding gatekeeping as a tech-
nology of governing, not a political system or type of African state. Gatekeeping practices 
are used by branches of government (gatekeeping being just one set of practices, among 
others, that governments use; thus, there is no assumption that they characterise state 
formation as a whole) and non-state actors. A focus on elite coalitions and rent-seeking 
within states risks blinding us from configurations of governing that go beyond the state, 
as well as the crucial role of travelling ideas and technologies in making certain practices of 
governing legitimate and possible, whilst others not. I thus argue that new large-scale invest-
ments – beyond the more frequent study of extractive industries – provide windows onto 
practices of gatekeeping in new ways; the ways they are used by different branches of gov-
ernment and state administration, corporations, competing groups of port and security 
professionals, as well as old and new investors. These affect reconfigurations of how ‘states’ 
are performed, as much as they give rise to new transnational political geographies.
With a great deal of external resources going into ports, mines, roads, and pipelines, sites 
of large-scale economic and infrastructure investment can thus be seen as ‘frontier zones’11 
in which well-known modes of governing are reproduced and reinforced, but in which con-
testation and new practices also become visible.12 The article analyses the different practices 
of gatekeeping that infrastructure hubs – and thus, the proliferation of new entrepôts – bring 
about, and the kind of ‘state effect’13 they have. It is also, however, an exploration of broader 
political geographies beyond the state, as infrastructure hubs form part of complex trans-
boundary topologies made up of a multiplicity of actors, standards and technologies, in 
particular so in times of intensifying South–South relations and increasingly diverse inter-
national relations of the continent.14
The argument will be developed using Tanzanian ports – the port of Dar es Salaam as 
well as new ports under consideration – as exemplary cases. Gates to the African continent 
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are once again high up on the international agenda.15 Prominent among them are the ports 
as major chokepoints through which African resources are accessible and fed into the global 
market. In Tanzania alone, the World Bank pledged $565 million to ‘Open[…] the Gates’16 to 
refurbish Dar es Salaam port. However, new funding opportunities have also given rise to a 
proliferation of new entrepôts along the Tanzanian coast with several major projects under 
way (though to varying degrees), such as an expansion of the port of Mtwara in anticipation 
of offshore gas exploitation by BG, Statoil and Ophir, and Tanga port to the north as hub for 
the oil to come through the new Uganda pipeline. The most spectacular project, however, 
is the planned new 800-hectare, US $10 billion megaport at Bagamoyo (about 60 km North 
of Dar es Salaam), funded by Chinese and Omani investors. Fieldwork was conducted in 
spring 2015 and consisted of interviews within the port of Dar es Salaam, as well as with key 
port stakeholders, including the Tanzanian Port Authority. In addition, reports by the port 
authority and international funders from the past seven years were consulted, and comple-
mented with an analysis of the reporting made in Tanzanian newspapers.
After conceptualising gatekeeping as a technology of governing, I use this lens to explore 
gatekeeping and ‘gate-making’ practised around the Tanzanian ports of Dar es Salaam and 
Bagamoyo. The article concludes by summarising the key arguments and discussing them 
in relation to the literature on extraction.
Gatekeeping and frontier zones of ‘the global’
As discussed in the introduction to this special issue, Frederick Cooper’s notion of a gate-
keeper state establishes the production of empirical statehood in Africa in the colonial 
encounter, coproduced by colonial governments that fostered an outward, extraction-ori-
ented political economy.17 He traces the emergence of fragmented territoriality organised 
around selected economic hubs back to the colonial past, and shows how ‘gatekeeper states’ 
emerged from this process and have been sustained by postcolonial governments, along 
with international and transnational actors. Gatekeeper states are characterised by relying 
on the control of access to revenue derived from movement and processes between the 
inside of a state and the outside world.18
These arguments draw on a long tradition of thought. The rentier state literature, for 
instance, has highlighted the complicit relationship between point-of-source extraction, 
external firms and regimes, stressing the importance of rents from natural resources along 
with sovereignty rents from security cooperation, corporate philanthropy and aid.19 In return, 
host governments deploy their coercive capacities in order to protect oil and mining instal-
lations,20 or – in fact – outsource these services to transnational actors. Soares de Oliveira 
talks of ‘successfully failed states’ in the case of the oil-rich states in the Gulf of Guinea: the 
governments of these states are successful in maintaining political power through extracting 
resource rents, and MNCs have built successful relationships with these governments to 
secure extraction.21
While it is a useful metaphor, there are two limitations in the analytical purchase of ‘the 
gatekeeper state’ that shall be addressed here. The first is that gatekeeping at times risks 
being used as a catch-all phrase for any strategy African governments use to regulate and 
limit contestation and access to higher political office. As Beresford argued, it is not synon-
ymous with corruption or the idea of neopatrimonialism either. Instead of a pathology of 
African states and societies, it relates to a broader spectrum of capitalist practices of 
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controlling access to revenues and opportunities in little-diversified and resource-dependent 
economies.22 ‘Harvesting’ revenue from key gates between the internal and the external 
world, based on the symbolic capital of the state mediating between the two, is thus a key 
practice of gatekeeping.23 Yet, firstly, it is not an exotic feature of African states but a broader 
phenomenon. Secondly, like neopatrimonialism, the notion of the gatekeeper state remains 
too broad. Instead of identifying a distinct type of state, gatekeeping practices occur in many 
societies and lead to very different political and economic (state) trajectories.24 Thirdly, this 
perspective causes us to narrowly focus on certain practices of gatekeeping, by certain actors, 
at the expense of others.
A second limitation is the focus on elite coalitions within states, and on government 
revenues and rent-seeking behaviour. In most studies of the political economy of infrastruc-
ture in Tanzania, there is a tendency to prioritise the ‘who’ question, and thus to echo a 
protracted research agenda intent on explaining policy outcomes as a result of elite bargains 
and factional struggles.25 This literature only tangentially touches upon issues of how forms 
of authority fluctuate over time. When it comes to infrastructure, the literature remains even 
more silent on the ‘how’ question. Thus, Matteo Rizzo’s probe into the delays in the Bus Rapid 
Transit System project in Dar es Salaam is concerned with ‘what different Tanzanian actors 
stood to lose from its implementation, and the way in which they were able to resist and 
influence the project’.26 Similarly, gatekeeper state perspectives focus on whether and how 
state elites keep control over revenues and side payments from large-scale investment. 
Whilst important, this does not pay sufficient attention to the role of perceptions and ideas 
in making certain actors and practices of governance, such as gatekeeping, legitimate and 
possible.27 It also accepts the state as a given and as the most relevant political entity, blinding 
out questions about configurations of governance beyond the state.
In particular, it is necessary to consider how territory has become a political technology 
beyond the state.28 Territoriality is a historically specific mode of organising social control in 
a ‘space with a border that allows effective control of public and political life’.29 It is linked to 
the emergence of sovereignty – the linking of political authority or ‘decision space’ to an 
‘identity space’ within the bounded territory of states. Although it was institutionalised as 
the dominant mode of political ordering in the era of the modern nation state (1870s–1960s), 
nowhere is it fully realised. The very idea of a boundary between an inside and an outside 
of the state is historically and geographically very specific.30 In many parts of Africa, and the 
rest of the world, the limited territorial reach of the central state is nothing new, and has 
always combined with a multiplicity of parallel, overlapping, and sometimes competing, 
spatial orders and sovereignties.31 Infrastructural power is limited and selectively developed 
and de facto statehood is less territorial than ‘rhizomatic’, as Bayart put it.32
It is important to bring this observation together with recent thought in economic and 
political geography. Deborah Cowen recently argued that at nodes of global transport (such 
as ports) different governmental logics clash: that of a global space of logistics with that of 
nation state territoriality.33 Within the large technical system of capitalist logistics, territory 
is not necessarily controlled by the governments of states but is a technology through which 
to govern beyond the state. As such‚ ‘global territories’ proliferate as transnational zones, 
gateways and corridors and are a core feature of neoliberal capitalism.34 This recalibration 
has been analysed as ‘geoeconomics’ to capture the reconfiguration of relations between 
space politics and economy;35 a ‘recalibration of international space between by globalised 
market logics and transnational actors’.36
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Ports are frontier zones of such recalibrations. Here is where it is most visible how ‘emer-
gent global assemblages coexist with vast stretches of older historical formations constitutive 
of the modern nation state’.37 Instead of focusing on the state’s role in controlling gates, and 
thus on the closing off and enclaving character of gates, it is important to shed light on 
connections and how they transform the way gates are shaped, and by whom. Indeed, ports 
are bubbles of governance characterised by a proliferation of transnational standards, tech-
nologies and professionals. They are transnationally connected and differentially bounded 
zones – a mixture of dis-embedding and connecting is evident. Most transnational business 
activity rely on ‘fixed and secure infrastructure’,38 yet their being organised through (gate-
keeper) states is historically specific. On the one hand, as Sidaway and Ong postulated, 
transport hubs such as ports can indeed be read as spaces in which sovereignty is gradu-
ated.39 On the other hand, the question is rather: what are the emerging social and political 
spatialities that dispersed networks of production and consumption bring into being? The 
challenge is to think of this in terms that overcome state-centric and territory-centric 
analysis.
This recalibration has implications on how to think about gatekeeping practices: who is 
involved, how it is done, and to what effect. Modes of regulating access to movement and 
resources change throughout history, and continue to do so today. Thus, the questions raised 
by Cooper remain important, but it is useful to extend them and look at them from a different 
angle. Elements of what Cooper termed the gatekeeper state are alive and well today, and 
gatekeeping still operates through pockets of state-controlled territory, with the help of 
foreign investors.40 Nevertheless, I suggest that it is analytically fruitful to move on from the 
form (gatekeeper state) to look at technologies of governing in order to study practices of 
gatekeeping: technologies that governments as well as other actors with claims to political 
authority use to control and shape key zones of circulation. Such practices may, for instance, 
include restricting access to political office to control gates, controlling access to sources of 
income from gates, or controlling physical access to economic hubs, such as by means of 
security measures (fences, access controls, special legislation). Gatekeeping also includes 
gaining new or keeping old gates through sustained investment over time. This is not an 
exhaustive list and part of the contribution of this article is to explore a greater breadth of 
these practices empirically.
Dar port and state practices of gatekeeping
For at least the past 30 years, the growth and integration of the shipping and logistics indus-
try has increased exponentially, and economic financialisation and deregulation have further 
eased transoceanic trade. In Tanzania, these transformations have manifested in a shift from 
the port of Dar, owned and run by the state-owned Tanzania Port Authority, to the private 
management of parts of the port. In the early 2000s, cargo and container operations were 
split into two terminals, and the container terminal was handed over to a private operator, 
Tanzania International Container Terminal Services Ltd (TICTS). TICTS is a joint venture 
between world-leading port operator Hutchison Port Holdings of Hong Kong and a Tanzanian 
business group. TICTS started to exclusively handle the containerised cargo mooring in 
berths 8–11, as well as utilising the largest section of the container yard for temporary 
storage.
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As argued above, this privatisation of part of the port should not be misunderstood as a 
loss of state control over the gate per se. Rather, ‘Gatekeepers have a capacity to grant or 
deny access to resources and opportunities’.41 The monopoly to grant licences to private 
actors for running key infrastructure, such as the licence to TICTS to run the Dar container 
terminal, or for mineral extraction, is a classic privilege and source of rent governments earn 
across the world. The landlord model is a widespread model of contemporary port manage-
ment and considered the most efficient in Africa.42
Furthermore, specific positions in the state administration offer privileged opportunities 
to control further access to revenues from the gate in the form of grand corruption. 
Importantly, gatekeeper politics are not synonymous with corruption, but corruption is a 
symptom of it, as are battles over who controls various rents accrued from the ‘gate’.43 In the 
case of Dar port, eyebrows were raised several times over non-transparent and collusive 
politics around it. First, the individuals behind the local shareholders of TICTS, a member of 
the Hong Kong based Hutchison Holdings Ltd., have not been disclosed. Second, the 
Tanzanian government ignored a negative parliamentary vote in 2010 and extended TICTS’s 
concession by 15 years.44 Adding to that, grand corruption and mismanagement have con-
tinued to plague senior members of the Tanzania Ports Authority (TPA). Scandals continually 
succeed one another. In 2012, the Director General, the Dar es Salaam Port Manager, and 
the Oil Jetty Manager were suspended on allegations of cargo theft; in January 2013, the 
new head of TPA was dismissed after an accusation of cargo and oil theft. His ordeal only 
worsened when he was later charged of irregularly awarding a Chinese company a tender 
to build the new berths in the port of Dar. Then, in February 2015, TPA’s Acting Director 
General Madeni Kipande was dismissed, pending an investigation into alleged mismanage-
ment.45 In the words of one interviewee:
I think TRA and the Port Authority were losing a lot of containers earlier […] the containers 
disappeared. People think it was theft […] We don’t know whether it was theft, or an inside job 
[…] It’s not only always corruption, but it’s also part of the failure to oversee things.46
Such mass theft is hardly possible without insider information from within core positions in 
the port.
The issue of mass container theft made it to the headlines of national newspapers again 
immediately after the election of President Magufuli in late 2015. Another large incident 
had happened and 349 containers reportedly went missing from the port. The highest offices 
– the President, the PM, and the Minister of Transport – launched a concerted, disciplinary 
campaign against corruption and pilfering at the port. It involved an impromptu visit to the 
port by PM Majaliwa, and the subsequent sacking of top officials. The PM descended once 
more on the port on 3 December and ordered Port Manager Mhanga to elaborate on new 
reports about 2,400 containers reportedly having disappeared from the port without due 
payment of taxes.47 Subsequently, Magufuli sacked the Permanent Secretary at the Ministry 
of Works, the TPA Director General, along with three additional senior and eight middle 
managers. He also dissolved the TPA board.48
As citizens became aware of the sheer scale of the embezzlement, the government, TPA 
and petty officials such as clearing agents in the port sought to blame each other. President 
Magufuli had run for office on a campaign of anti-corruption and presented himself as a 
hands-on, uncompromising fighter of corruption. It is important to consider, however, that 
reshuffles of administrators in Tanzanian state-owned enterprises and bureaucracies have 
regularly occurred in Tanzania.49 It remains to be seen whether and how the recent shakeups 
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will change state practices of gatekeeping around Dar port. They may yet prove to be another 
expression of factional fights between different factions within the ruling CCM party, using 
an anti-corruption discourse for a reshuffle of who/which rentier faction accesses the same 
old rents from the gate.50
Aside from grand corruption, the port of Dar is also plagued by petty corruption at various 
levels. It is further evident that the centralisation of petty rents from gates is indeed limited 
in Tanzania.51 With the digitalisation of the port, information has become less accessible and 
container theft in the port has decreased. However, such activity has (for the main part) just 
been pushed outside the port. In the eyes of some consignees, ICDs brought about collusive 
business relations between private owners and top TPA officials, who secured protection 
and greater activity to certain ICDs.52 Whilst ICDs have eased port congestion to a large 
extent, they have only displaced – if not reinvigorated – harassment from public agents, due 
to the alleged collusion between TPA authorities and ICD owners, instilling a perverse incen-
tive to create further delays and, hence, storage charges.53 Higher ranking officials within 
the main port prefer to roam around the port or the ICDs in search of opportunities for 
harassment.54 There is also a profusion of controls, with different offices and agencies per-
forming similar controls. Again, this starts making sense once the political economy of cor-
ruption is brought into the equation.55 Port and customs authorities use the 7-day grace 
storage period – which if exceeded attracts port charges – to their advantage, pushing back 
inspections, signatures and the issuance of release orders. Overall, petty corruption is 
accepted and decentralised. ‘Decentralized rentscrapping’, Cooksey and Kelsall argue, is ‘part 
of what it takes to do business or merely go about one’s daily life in Tanzania’.56
Thus, from large-scale corruption by high-level bureaucrats (TPA, TRA) to petty corruption 
in the lower echelons of state administration and the business sector, the Tanzanian gov-
ernment at best only loosely centralises rent management.57 Grand corruption is more cen-
tralised – within key figures of the ruling party but not necessarily controlled by the 
president.58 Therefore, unpacking what is meant by ‘the state’ is crucial here, in order to look 
at different gatekeeping practices and ideas beyond the (gatekeeper) state.
Extending, multiplying and transforming gates: Dar port as transnational 
project
Gates are not something that only African governments are concerned with. Seaports, like 
airports and undersea cable landing points, are ‘gateways, nodes that function as a region’s 
entry or exit point, house a range of technologies, and comply with standards that knit 
together heterogeneous communities of practice’.59 Such gateways are strategic geopolitical 
locations, where things that circulate can be controlled, censored or intercepted. However, 
they are also sites for potential disruption. This is the reason for the application of strategies 
of insulation to protect (and keep) the gate, by various actors. Narrow questions about the 
nature and survival of state (elites) totally obscure such dynamics.
Indeed, the metaphor of gatekeeping is as much about gatekeeping – to prevent others 
from accessing revenues – as it is about keeping things flowing through these gates, and 
establishing new gates to continue to do so. Over and above traditional elite politics, a 
broader re-spacing of Africa is under way. Ports are global ‘zones’ through which extraction 
and trade are organised and secured by a multiplicity of standards and technologies.60 As a 
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consequence, ports are managed by a heterogeneous set of actors with distinct, graduated 
claims to authority over particular issue areas and spaces.61
Thus, different governmental strategies by a multiplicity of actors are at work in the port 
of Dar es Salaam. The port, as mentioned above, changed from a state-centred arrangement 
to a public-private landlord-model in the early 2000s, when the container terminal was 
handed over to a private operator: Tanzania International Container Terminal Services Ltd 
(TICTS). TICTS is a joint venture between world-leading port operator Hutchison Port 
Holdings of Hong Kong and a Tanzanian business group. The port is also being refurbished 
and substantially extended. These extensions are an international project. Donors such as 
the European Commission, the World Bank and DFID provide the funding required to push 
the global agenda of trade facilitation forward. The World Bank and DFID – through its sub-
sidiary, TradeMark East Africa – foot the bill for the USD 565 million required to refurbish the 
port of Dar and its vicinities towards doubling the port’s throughput.62 This is in addition to 
earlier assistance provided by the World Bank to the Tanzania Ports Authority to train security 
officers, install CCTV, and purchase patrol boats and vehicles. International donors also pro-
vide the intellectual backbone underpinning such agenda, all within the ‘Big Results Now’ 
narrative. This initiative was inspired by the so-called Malaysian Development Model, which 
has been in implementation since 2013 and has the goal of delivering quantifiable policy 
outcomes in six priority areas. Predicated upon the trinity of trade, investment and poverty 
reduction, this ‘theory of change’ anticipates increased physical access to markets, an 
enhanced trade environment and improved business competitiveness. 63
The internationalisation inherent in these port reform projects is ambivalent as regards 
the reconfiguration of what Cooper referred to as the gatekeeper state. On the one hand, 
ideas about how the port should be governed have shifted and market logics have been 
integrated into efforts of building a ‘governance state’.64 An illustration of this came from the 
Tanzanian government minister, when he called on state agencies TPA and TRA to ‘stop being 
so bureaucratic’65 to focus on facilitating throughput and the global flow of goods. The 
Maritime Gateway project to reform the port of Dar es Salaam includes efforts at improving 
‘good governance’ and anti-corruption. On the other hand, the reform agenda keeps the 
government in the privileged position of being able to negotiate new licence agreements 
and contracts for refurbishment, and to interpellate the state as the sovereign and legitimate 
authority to regulate and control what goes through the port. Thereby, in practice, they 
enact and reinforce the (gatekeeper) state.66
The Tanzanian Port Authority saw its role diminish with the privatisation of the container 
terminal, in the sense that it no longer runs it. However, it retains the operation of the remain-
ing berths, and has regulatory authority over the privatised ‘global zone’ of the container 
port. The Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA), for instance, retained jurisdiction over taxation 
of trade activities. In particular, it alone authorises the displacement of containers, or bulk 
cargo, inside and outside the port. Other state agencies are assigned other controls that 
alter container flows, ranging from Customs, the Weights and Measures Agency, to various 
ministries and sector-specific agencies. A diminishment of state power is, therefore, not the 
outcome of these transformations, as prominent critics of privatisation have argued. Rather, 
ideas and practices of how ports should be run have become rearticulated through trans-
national ‘modes of government’ that include companies, transnational experts and other 
intermediaries.67
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A further indicator of the port as a frontier zone and transnational project is the Fair 
Competition Commission (FCC) installed as a new mediator between multinational corpo-
rations and the Dar port authority. Attempts on the part of the FCC to enforce anti-counterfeit 
regulations anchored locally the efforts of multinationals such as Samsung, Phillips and 
Unilever to protect their high-value trade across transnational routes and market places. 
Whilst engineers and representatives from these multinational companies need only descend 
upon Tanzania in person once every three months, they oversee their interests in the 
Tanzanian market from a distance through the FCC’s mediation. ‘[T]ransnational apparatuses 
of governmentality […] overlay […] and coexist […] with older, nation-state based modes 
of governance’.68 Although the Tanzanian government remains the main gatekeeper regard-
ing licences and other revenues accrued from granting access to the port, ports are also 
spaces of graduated sovereignty. Infrastructural developments and state authority may 
coevolve, but this leads to much more diverse results in terms of power and authority than 
a reinforcement of the gatekeeper state. Brenda Chalfin’s work on the Ghanaian port of Tema 
finds that the government’s strategic partnership with private logistical operators granted 
the port operator the ability to enact ‘modalities of governance that the state could never 
fully pursue on its own’.69
At the same time, however, international standardisation, such as the International 
Shipping and Port Security Code (ISPS), and transnational technological devices, such as 
cargo scanners and other electronic equipment, transform how power is exercised and create 
a form of ‘derivative sovereignty’70 through highly technocratic political arrangements – 
neither state nor non-state. One such global technology in Dar is the e-customs programme 
TANCIS. The Tanzanian Revenue Authority launched the Tanzania Customs Integrated System 
(TANCIS) in 2014, ‘built on hi-tech principles with a view to increasing effectiveness, efficiency, 
transparency, and reliability in the Customs administration’.71 TANCIS follows similar systems 
introduced in Hong Kong (1986), Singapore (1989–1991), Malaysia (1996–2004), Ghana 
(2001) and Nigeria (2009). Crucially, TANCIS substitutes tax officials and clearing agents in 
favour of electronic procedures, thus powerfully transforming who controls, and is able to 
interfere, with flows of cargo. However, the new system is not all-powerful; the programme 
has not yet fully supplanted previous practice, with some handling still being carried out on 
paper. An unintended effect is that tax agents can now switch from the virtual to the physical 
environment at their convenience, thus retaining a margin for manoeuvre in governing port 
activities.72 Nevertheless, the electronic system and the standards it operates under illustrate 
gates as part of a global zone that is bounded by standards and harmonised technology, 
not physical boundaries.73 Supply chain governance can decouple exceptional zones and 
‘secure areas’ from domestic politics and integrate them in contemporary logistical 
landscapes.74
Gate-making – imaginaries of development from Dubai to China
The gate economy is growing and new gates to Africa are continually being built based not 
only on new sources of investment, but also on new imaginaries of development. Imaginaries 
about infrastructure and modernity have been crucial drivers behind large infrastructure 
projects in the past, and they continue to be so today.75 Imaginaries evolve with time, and 
change, and are located in specific contexts.
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Lobo-Guerrero illustrates such a shift that has taken place between the early twentieth 
century and contemporary narratives about the port of Hamburg. From being seen as a 
place of exchange and a ‘clearing-house for international commerce’ in the past, the port is 
now understood as a ‘future-oriented, market-seeking, successful economic venture’.76 Much 
of the discourse used by the Hamburg port authority resembles that used in reference to 
Dar port: traffic jams are not only a new matter of concern in Dar, but also in Hamburg, where 
the port authority calls for ‘no jams in front of the gateway to the world’.77
Yet infrastructure is back on the agenda, not only for African governments, but also in an 
increasingly diverse set of international development agendas more broadly. In addition to 
the World Bank, the Western-led Infrastructure Consortium Africa and NEPAD-led Programme 
for Infrastructural Development, many African governments and the African Union have 
concluded deals with the governments of China, Brazil and the Gulf monarchies to further 
develop ports and other infrastructure. These new investors, with the models and imaginaries 
of the modern futures they evoke, merit more attention.
The most spectacular new project in Tanzania is the planned 800-hectare megaport at 
Bagamoyo, about 60 km South of Dar es Salaam, funded – and also inspired by – models of 
development from the Gulf and China. The idea of a new port in Bagamoyo had been present 
in the port community since at least 2007; the former government of president Kikwete 
pushed for its realisation. However, the project did not actually start to take shape until 
October 2014, when Tanzania signed a memorandum of understanding with China and 
Oman. Thereafter, reports in the media about the progress of the project were contradictory, 
until a major breakthrough occurred in October 2015 when, two months before his mandate 
expired, President Kikwete laid the foundation stone for the 800-hectare port, and an adja-
cent 1,700-hectare Export Processing Zone in his hometown. The government launched the 
major initiative promising the ability to handle even the largest Panamax container vessel, 
and a handling capacity of twenty million containers a year (Dar’s capacity is less than one 
million).78 After it was announced as being shelved by the new Magufuli administration in 
January 2016,79 the project is going ahead with funding from China and Oman, and the 
Deputy Minister of Trade, Industry and Investment announced in October 2017 that it will 
be operational from 2020 to 2021.80
The Bagamoyo megaport was presented by the Kikwete government as making the 
Tanzanian state a gateway to modernity. Although this is very close to the World Bank’s lan-
guage around the Maritime Gateway Project, which focuses on Dar port, Western donors 
were against it, and argued for exhausting Dar’s potential fully before investing in new 
infrastructures.81 Yet the modernity envisioned, and funding for it, no longer depend on 
Western models. Instead, imaginaries of how to be(come) modern take new and more diverse 
routes. This has been argued more broadly by Sidaway;82 and along the East African coast, 
references to this kind of diversification are notable. Djibouti, apart from having become 
the host for military bases for the US, France, Japan, and China, has allowed Dubai’s DP World 
to construct a large multi-purpose port at Dolareh. Africa Riskwatch sees this alongside other 
strategies of establishing new commercial hubs based on South–South investment and 
vision, such as that by Rwanda (hub to the Great Lakes) and Kenya (‘Kenya’s ‘Vision 2030’ 
plan vows to ‘bring Dubai to Kenya’ through large infrastructure projects).83
In the case of Bagamoyo, the port and the planned adjacent special economic zone are 
modelled on two major archetypes of new zones of development: Dubai and Shenzen. The 
Tanzanian president stated in 2014: ‘If we invest in logistic centres, improve on infrastructure 
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and create a facilitative environment, we can easily turn Dar es Salaam into another Dubai 
of its kind’.84 This idea was then attached to the new Bagamoyo mega-project, and there is 
no doubt that it taps into a more widespread narrative about Dubai as model for commercial 
success.85 As I have argued elsewhere, it has come to not only embody the idea of an enact-
ment of seamless ‘topological compression’, but is the inspiration for distinct ‘economies of 
anticipation’86 attached to a ‘Dubai model’. As shown by Wippel and Chorin, the exact content 
of the Dubai model remains rather vague. It boils down to anticipating that Bagamoyo may 
emulate Dubai’s exceptional development as global shopping mall and logistics hub (despite 
Dubai’s unique circumstances, which are unlikely to be replicable elsewhere).87
Yet Dubai is, of course, not the only imaginary, and source of funding, for new gates. The 
Chinese ambassador to Tanzania recently proclaimed that the Bagamoyo project would turn 
Bagamoyo into a new Shenzhen.88 As described by Brautigam and Xiao, Shenzhen was part 
of an early experiment with foreign direct investment and market liberalisation in China, 
and one of the first four SEZs on the mainland, created in 1979.89 It is seen as a particularly 
successful case, having transformed ‘from fishing village to an industrialised metropolis 
within a generation’.90 The China Merchants Group had a key role in Shenzen’s development 
and China Merchants Holding International is now chiefly involved in implementing and 
running the new Bagamoyo port.
Both narratives resonate with the argument that infrastructures not only perform tech-
nical functions, but also generate visions and evoke desire,91 an aspect barely captured by 
the rentier and gatekeeper-state literature. There is a long tradition of using large-scale 
infrastructures to represent state power to its citizens. Although they are also about gaining 
new gates and the revenues from them, the anthropology of the state has shown how new 
roads, dams and ports enact ‘the state’ and bring symbolic capital to legitimise it.92 In the 
case of Bagamoyo port, even newspapers such as The Citizen or The East African, more often 
than not detractors of Tanzanian authorities, have praised the Bagamoyo project within their 
pages.93 Such appreciation is not always linked to functionality as infrastructure comes to 
represent ‘the possibility of being modern, of having a future, or the foreclosing of that 
possibility’.94
Conclusion
Starting from Frederick Cooper’s notion of the gatekeeper state, this article suggested mov-
ing beyond the gatekeeper state as a structure, and instead to look at the processes around 
gates – and at gatekeeping practices – by state elites and other actors. Such an approach 
not only keeps in view that gates are important sites from which governments derive rents 
and revenue, but also affords more attention and analytical space to trace broader transfor-
mations of power and authority in Africa beyond the state. New large-scale investments in 
infrastructure – beyond the more frequently studied extractive industries – offer windows 
onto transnational practices of gatekeeping in new ways, and as used by different branches 
of government and state administration, corporations, competing groups of (port) profes-
sionals, and security services. In this sense, ports are veritable frontier zones in which trans-
national political geographies emerge and transform. In particular, gatekeeping as a practice 
is a fruitful analytical strategy to capture the imaginaries of development, and practices that 
‘new’ investors, such as China and the Gulf Monarchies, incite. They inform us of how states 
are performed and transnational zones are governed today.
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Focusing on ports and not more frequently studied gates usefully diversifies our under-
standing of the geographies of power and authority in Africa. In contrast to point source 
extraction by large-scale oil and mining companies, ports have a more diverse set of actors 
involved – as part of a global network of logistics and transport – and are more difficult to 
control centrally. For extractive industries it has been shown that privatisation as ‘indirect 
discharge’ is an important technology by which seemingly weak states (re)gain control of 
gates by relying on transnational actors.95 Beyond such effects of state reconfiguration and 
a regaining of strength by incumbent elites, much more is at play in transport hubs. Tanzanian 
ports are part of a global logistical infrastructure in which complex technical systems pow-
erfully govern access, flows and ruptures. At the same time, more diverse visions of devel-
opment shape the emergence and governance of new gates, featuring new investment from 
the Global South, especially in infrastructure.
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